Michael Hughes
February 8, 2025

“I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death.” -Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)

According to realist theorist Hans Morgenthau, all politics is a struggle for power – a theory based on the darkest views of human nature; and one that is, unfortunately, applicable to the state of politics in most capitals worldwide. The power struggles do not only occur between reigning and opposition factions. Those who take power are often forced to fight internal battles to remain in power, and such is the case in Afghanistan – where civil wars within civil wars are brewing.

Afghan governments have suffered divisions since the Durrani monarchy collapsed in a spat between cousins in the 1970s, which ended four decades of relative stability and unity. The government used strong-hand tactics to be sure. The Durrani dynasty endured by employing a Turkic-Mongol autocratic structure adopted from Nadir Shah’s Persia. But the model was less important than pragmatic policies – the rulers from 1933 to 1973 kept the rule from entanglement in foreign conflicts, while preventing the eruption of civil war. 

Many are mistaken to think the Taliban were strongly united under Mullah Omar. In fact, as we’ve reported here, the one-eyed Mullah’s overthrow was thwarted by the U.S. bombing campaign which of course pushed the Taliban together against the foreign invader. The Taliban tried and failed to implement a caliphate model along the lines of Ottoman and Arab rulers. The structured centralized hierarchy turned out to be brittle and ripe for implosion. 

Taliban 2.0 was founded on an even flimsier ground than the first version. The Taliban movement in its second incarnation has no Mullah Omar figure in the first place. The Taliban insurgency was deeply fragmented, with power divided among the Haqqani Network, the Quetta Shura, and other factions. Hibatullah was the movement’s leader in name only – he had never won the loyalty of all Taliban factions. These deep divisions have naturally remained and have been reinforced. The fault lines were not visible as the parties focused on driving out the coalition and toppling Ghani. But now these divides are as clear as day.

The internal civil wars are a bit baffling as they seem to cut across ideological and political lines subtly and in unexpected ways. The most obvious struggle, between Hibatullah and Haqqani, has escalated to new heights in recent months. Hibatullah’s Kandahar circle has made power moves as Sirajuddin Haqqani has been AWOL abroad. This looks like a raw power struggle and turf war. The two factions fully embrace the same twisted ideology and aspirations to fully implement a seventh-century society in Afghanistan.

Other potential Machiavellian maneuvers have been seen but are harder to interpret. On the one hand, there may very well be an ideological split. Some within the Taliban may think the complete enslavement of women might be a bridge too far. Sher Abbas Stanikzai, the Taliban’s political deputy at the foreign ministry, fled the country after slamming the ban on women’s education. And how does one explain reports that members of the Taliban assisted the ICC in seeking to arrest Hibatullah? 

Now, I doubt any of these Taliban members suddenly believe in women’s rights. They are pragmatists. They simply think it is too risky to go full blown seventh-century with opposition and Pakistani forces pressing politically and militarily from all sides and the economy collapsing. The Taliban pragmatists believe the group risks losing support from powerful external allies, who eventually will draw a line. Moreover, the Taliban spiral into absolute depravity makes the opposition stronger. The spotlight on the radical’s perverse policies could boost resistance unity and the movement’s international standing.

And there is definitely something in the air. Could the times really be a-changin? Some experts believe so.

“Rising tensions between Kandahar and the Haqqani network, combined with a worsening economy, could lead to significant developments in Afghanistan’s political landscape,” political analyst Najib Rahman Shomal told Amu TV.

What does a shift in the political landscape look like? The National Resistance Front’s Hamed Saifi has warned that merely hoping the radicals implode is not a strategy that will make Afghan society any better. He then called for unity among anti-Taliban factions. This only leads to the next question: will the factions that oust the Taliban be much better? The next regime might be the lesser of evils – which of course is not saying much. And now we are at the heart of the matter – a vicious cycle. For, to paraphrase Plato, those who seek power are exactly the type of people that should not have it.

Morgenthau’s theory is no theory at all. It is a strategy. One of the causes of power politics. Any explanatory value from his theory applies to the power-hungry. Contra Morgenthau and Hobbes, I think a large percentage of Afghans at this moment desire little more than food, shelter, clothing, security, and education.