“The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into right, and obedience into duty.” – Jean Jacques Rousseau

Michael Hughes
November 2, 2024

At some point, based on the laws of human nature, Afghans will no doubt say “enough.” The violations of universal social norms, incompetence, and instability make for a perfect storm and could finally turn the tables. The odds are high a legitimate civil war is brewing that will genuinely threaten Taliban control over vast portions of the country. However, unless the radical regime completely disintegrates from within, history indicates this will be a long and bloody affair.

The Taliban have been implementing extremist measures with impunity, including prohibiting images and banning women from speaking. No fallout is evident in any headlines. The outrage expressed by world leaders and the UN appear to mean nothing. But the reality is, Afghans are growing increasingly “disobedient.” Exacerbating the frustration is the Taliban’s failure to bring the stability and security they have promised, driven by an unwillingness to effectively counter IS-K.

Taliban have been under attack, especially in the country’s north. A recent assault on a compound in Faryab province left two members of the radical movement dead. Four Taliban were killed near the Interior Ministry in the middle of October in an attack claimed by the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), while an Afghan military airport was pummeled by rockets in the same week. 

In addition to assassination attempts and armed resistance nationwide, Afghans are fighting back non-violently, according to journalist Chris Fitzgerald in a piece for Asia Times published on October 29. The author said more subtle forms of protest are becoming commonplace, noting a protest by elderly Afghans outside of the Taliban’s finance ministry over unpaid salaries, along with marches and social media campaigns against the oppression of women.

It was always easier for the Taliban to fight rather than govern, and questions loom over the exact strength and loyalty of its forces, but Kabul is not the house of cards it was under the Ghani administration. Last year, the Taliban claimed Afghanistan’s military had 170,000 uniformed troops. We all know that the Taliban seized billions of dollars’ worth of weaponry left behind by coalition forces during the exit three years ago – goodies they literally paraded in August. The jackpot reportedly includes 73 aircraft and about 100 military vehicles.

Some will argue that a civil war has been ongoing since the Taliban grabbed power, but a real one will surface only when several provinces fall and are under the opposition’s complete control; and the resistance clearly proves it can maintain security and governance in captured territories. Then, the game would be on.

In the meantime, the resistance, as we know, has been plagued by disunity, although there seems to be growing cooperation between top anti-Taliban factions like the AFF and National Resistance Front (NRF). Even if unified the question then becomes whether the resistance has the capacity and firepower to make this a real fight. An insurrection does not necessarily require 73 jets. As insurgents, the Taliban won battles with Toyota trucks and AK-47s. Yet, lest we forget, the Taliban insurgents also had material support from a nation-state – Pakistan. 

Which raises the eternal question: should external powers fund, train and/or arm the resistance? The situation in Afghanistan is unbearable, but significantly meddling in the country’s internal affairs and backing opposition could make things worse – and more so politically because it will appear that outsiders are, once again, grooming puppets to rule in Kabul.

Is a military coup the best route? Who would defect? The idea of an internal revolt is not without foundation. In fact, Taliban 1.0 was potentially on the verge of implosion before and shortly after 9/11, according to ex-British intelligence agents, U.S. diplomats, and experts. Moderate, repentant, and not-so-repentant mujahideen commanders from across Afghanistan had secured agreements with pivotal Taliban commanders to turn on the movement’s leaders. However, the plan was disrupted by Pakistan’s spy service and al-Qaeda taking out the planners. And, of course, putting the final nail into the scheme’s coffin, was Operation Enduring Freedom.

“Might makes right” is a philosophical concept, on the one hand, and a description of reality where it comes to fruition. Even more eerily applicable in Afghanistan might be the call of Roman conquerors: “vae victis,” or “woe to the vanquished.” Taliban rule is a case study for testing the endurance of these propositions. History has shown that even the mightiest fall when hardly a shred of support is left among the populace. The Taliban conquered with ease and subjugated a mostly helpless population with little effort. But ruling with no concern for those ruled, subjects both armed and unarmed, is a recipe for downfall. At a minimum, the Taliban’s outrageous actions are increasingly making Afghans less acquiescent. The seeds of uprising are potentially being sown.