“The guerrilla must move amongst the people as a fish swims in the sea”
-Mao Zedong

Michael Hughes
May 4, 2024

Anthropologist Jesse Barfield argued that throughout history Afghans never “united” in the strict sense of the term to oust an invader, they actually scattered and became ungovernable, while attacking the enemy from all different directions. This fundamental disunity embedded seeds of future discord. Of course when the infidel began exiting during the anti-Soviet jihad, the insurgents quickly turned the guns on each other, as we noted in AOP four years ago.

“The last remaining thread that had bound the mujahideen into a marriage of convenience broke when they no longer had a common enemy,” Barfield wrote in Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. “Its leaders had no clear goals because their unity had been based on resistance against the Soviet Union and its client Afghan government, not any popular political platform.”

The current fragmented resistance suffers from these same defects and more. In fact, previous insurgencies, however fractured, at least fought under the same brand name. For example, the “Taliban” organization was never a monolithic entity. It was a completely disparate set of groups with distinct leadership, such as the Haqqani Network, Quetta central, and other various affiliated factions. And the catch-all category “mujahideen” from the late 1970s covered the Peshawar 7 factions, which never really operated as one cohesive unit in the first place, in addition to resistance wings rooted inside Afghanistan. 

Yet both the mujahideen and Taliban movements were more united than the current resistance to the Taliban 2.0 regime and have been much less effective both politically and militarily. A clash of personalities and ego seems to be one of the major unfortunate obstacles with the head of the Afghanistan Freedom Front (AFF), Yasin Zia, for example, unlikely willing to take marching orders from Ahmad Massoud, leader of the National Resistance Front (NRF). Muhammad Ali Nazari in Hasht-e Subh Daily clearly spells out the crux of the dilemma.

“The warfare waged by these fronts has so far been sporadic and opportunistic, inflicting casualties on the Taliban, but since Taliban fighters hold no value for the leadership of these groups and are treated merely as cannon fodder, the killing of some of them does not concern Mullah Hibatullah and his associates,” Nazari wrote on May 1.

The Taliban, Nazari added, will only become concerned when the resistance reclaims territory lost. But, given NRF and AFF activities, “it seems unlikely that they can create such concern and challenge for the Taliban in the short term.” Moreover, the resistance is faring no better on the political front, according to Nazari, who says the insurgents have failed to establish themselves as a legitimate alternative to the Taliban in the eyes of the Afghan people.

“Due to their not-so-good political history, particularly the leaders of political parties, they have lost much of the public’s trust,” Nazari said. “They have neither been able to engage with the global community nor rebuild their tarnished image among the people of Afghanistan. The continuation of this situation brings more suffering to the people of Afghanistan.”

COIN strategist Roger Trinquier posited that the sine qua non of any insurgency movement was support of the local populace. The Taliban never won the hearts of the Afghan people, but were simply seen as a lesser of evils that could at least bring some semblance of stability regardless how ruthlessly imposed. And this is where the opportunity lies because the Taliban have failed to live up to their commitments and have allowed extremist groups to bloom and terrorize the entire country.

The Taliban were successful as insurgents at positioning the group as a viable alternative to the corrupt Karzai and Ghani regimes. The Taliban even set up shadow courts perceived as more efficient than those of the central government. The resistance could take similar steps if they get beyond their divisions. A political platform is essential, one that accommodates Afghanistan’s ethnosectarian mosaic. 

This requires practical action, besides slogans and beatitudes. The resistance leaders must put aside aspirations to have their faces on political posters. Now is not the time for such luxuries. The opposition must become a real united social and political movement, not simply militaristic factions taking pot shots at any Taliban walking down the street. Policing activities in the community would be a more fruitful next step rather than trying to dream up a full front offensive against the heart of the Taliban. Who will defend the Afghan people against IS-K? The Taliban have proven inept and unwilling.

The international community is not ready to support the opposition. To take a page from the Irish Republican Army’s political wing: “We Ourselves” (Sinn Fein). It is time for the resistance to bond with the Afghan populace. It is time to jump into the proverbial sea.