Do We Want a Stable
Democracy in Afghanistan -
Or Just a Short Term Ally to Fight the Taliban?
Neil Wollman and Abdulhadi Hairan
May 5, 2010
In late March, President Obama paid a surprise visit to Kabul to meet his
Afghan counterpart, reportedly asking Karzai to improve governance reform to
combat corruption. Since then, the two governments have exchanged jabs. Karzai
has been openly defiant of U.S. concerns, specifically election reform in the
wake of a presidential election widely considered fraudulent, and has charged
foreign interference in elections. The U.S. has focused on his decrees
eliminating UN participants on the Election Complaint Commission (which was
followed by a partial retreat). The reaction by the Afghan Parliament has been
mixed, with the Karzai-dominated upper house supporting his decrees and the
lower house rejecting them. In March, Karzai told a UN representative that by
mid-April there would be a “major and constructive reshuffle of the election
commission,” and he did dismiss the head of the Independent Election Commission
(IEC). Most recently, Karzai and the UN worked out a compromise that makes some
positive changes in personnel and procedure that will improve election
governance, and which has brought the UN and donor nations on board to fund the
September parliamentary elections. However, there are complaints from Afghan
opposition leaders and some in parliament who say that the reforms are not
sufficient. And likely were only enough to win international funding for the
election.
What is known is that widespread corruption, going far beyond just elections,
is destroying Afghan society. It continues to undermine efforts by the
international community and Afghans to promote democracy, security, and
nation-building, and to fight narcotics trafficking. The Karzai administration
has dismissed any mention of corruption, labeling it as “foreign meddling.” But
in Kandahar recently, Karzai heard the same complaints from his home town and
tribe. There to solicit cooperation for the upcoming major military operation
against the insurgents, Karzai was told by a tribal elder that his government
was as much a problem for local people as were the insurgents. Afghan citizens
interviewed by the second author of this piece said that the government is a
problem on all levels–from top ministers and advisers to local employees.
Corruption, nepotism, and the rule of warlords is badly affecting the Afghan
people and their hopes for the future. It was not until Karzai’s fraudulent
election victory that the issue of corruption in Afghanistan was thrust into the
global spotlight and the Obama administration felt compelled to speak out. The
question is, how willing is the U.S. to confront the issue?
There are at least two possible paths here for the Obama administration, and
signals indicate that it is opting for a short term strategy that is more
expedient, but a recipe for long-term failure. It appears Obama has chosen not
to push for reform, preferring not to rock the boat. He needs Karzai’s
cooperation in fighting the Taliban and in using U.S. and NATO forces to defeat
the insurgents—eventually enabling the U.S. President to meet a policy goal and
withdraw U.S. troops without losing face. Recent statements by top level
Administration officials echo the assertion that Karzai is the head of a
sovereign state and that he has been a loyal ally. And now the hot rhetoric
between the two countries has ended. Presumably, then, especially with some give
by Karzai on election reform, the U.S. will give only lip service to the need
for changes in Afghan governance, hoping there is enough popular dislike of the
Taliban and military fire-power to succeed.
Even if successful—not a given-- this path will very likely result in a
resurgence of the Taliban later, as occurred following the first U.S. effort to
finish them off. For whatever military victory is achieved now will be lost in
the future because of the lack of popular support for a corrupt Afghan
administration. When that happens, will the U.S. be ready to fight the Taliban
for a third time if it feels that it is in its strategic interest? Would there
be any stomach for such a war among the U.S. public, even among those who would
feel it is morally justified?
Can the U.S. push Karzai for reform? This risks alienating him, but on the
other hand Karzai is beholden to U.S. forces to remain in power. The Obama
administration could pressure (not abandon) Karzai to make changes and could
work with the international community, the UN, and sympathetic Afghan parliament
members and citizen groups to truly reduce the systemic corruption. It would
help to accompany this with a foreign aid program to help build strong Afghan
educational, economic, and political infrastructures. Such a comprehensive
effort, which is less costly than an ongoing war, would likely ensure a
government which is supported by Afghans, who would, then, surely reject the
harmful Taliban for good.
Foreign interference in another government’s internal politics should always
be suspect, but in this case it is the lesser of two evils. It is the right path
for Obama to take for both moral and political reasons. Currently, it does not
look like the U.S. will take the gamble to push for real change in Afghanistan.
We hope we are wrong.
Neil Wollman; Ph. D.; Senior Fellow, Bentley Alliance for Ethics and Social
Responsibility; Bentley University; Waltham, MA, 02452;
NWollman@Bentley.edu
Abdulhadi Hairan; Research Analyst at the Centre for Conflict and Peace
Studies (CAPS), Kabul www.caps.af; Project
Analyst at Pajhwok Afghan News, Kabul
www.pajhwok.com;
http://www.abdulhadihairan.com
Back to Top
