Back to square one
By Haroun Mir
August 19, 2009
After a successful Afghan presidential election in 2004 and parliamentary
elections in 2005, we will vote for the second time in the history of our
country to elect a president Aug. 20. The security situation has drastically
deteriorated since 2004, which will have serious implications on political
stability. The Taliban have declared that they will disrupt the election, and
the country remains divided along ethnic lines. Therefore, we fear that
Afghanistan might emerge weaker after this election because the legitimacy of
the next government might be undermined if people don't perceive the election as
transparent and fair.
The presidential race is reduced to a competition at the level of political
compromises instead of a genuine debate over political agenda or a clear vision
for the future of Afghanistan. The likelihood that the loser might not concede
defeat the day the results are announced is very high, because not only have
emotions grown high in the context of three decades of conflict, but also a
number of regional and neighboring countries have high stakes in the Afghan
election and would like to manipulate Afghan politics for their own interests.
The prospect of a runoff in the second round (if no candidate receives 50
percent of the vote in the first round) could further increase the likelihood of
ethnic polarization, as the two leading candidates, Hamid Karzai and Abdullah
Abdullah, are backed by the Pashtun and Tajik ethnic groups, respectively. The
outcome of the election will heavily depend on the decision of minority Hazaras
and Uzbeks, whose votes could tilt the balance one way or the other. The current
situation in Afghanistan is not that different from the 1990s, but, this time,
Afghan leaders are using political rallies instead of arms to convince people to
support them.
In fact, more than eight years after the military defeat of the Taliban,
Afghanistan is back to square one. Insecurity and poverty are Afghans' utmost
concerns. In addition, the lack of enthusiasm for the upcoming presidential
election among the ordinary people is an indication of their disenchantment with
democracy. Today's political coalitions remind us of the 1990s. The same
political actors, who should have been sidelined from the political process, are
still competing for the faith of Afghans in hopes of leading the country.
Meanwhile, senior officials from the Afghan Diaspora who were once considered a
hope for the country after the fall of the Taliban have lost their credibility
by enriching themselves to the detriment of the poor.
Deteriorating security since 2006 is clearly a key factor behind the overall
deterioration of the situation. It took Obama's election for the U.S. government
to develop a clear strategy for Afghanistan. The U.S. military surge will take
time; securing some of the districts in the south and east of the country, where
government authority is totally absent, will not be easy.
The relationship between security and development in Afghanistan resembles
the old chicken or the egg causality dilemma. Development experts criticize lack
of security as a main cause for slow development, whereas NATO generals say slow
development hinders security. In reality, the lack of coordination among
different donor countries, a deteriorating security situation as well as the
Afghan government's inability to produce even mediocre accomplishments and its
penchant for mismanaging funds all contribute their fair share.
Furthermore, the gap between a new class of rich and the rest of the
population is quickly widening, and the Taliban are recruiting disenfranchised
young men even in relatively peaceful northern provinces like Kunduz. I warned
about the rise of insurgency in northern and western provinces in an article
published in June 2007. Afghans in general are disillusioned with the U.S. model
of democracy and a free market economy because they witness their country
sliding slowly toward political chaos and mafia-style economics.
Even more so than security and development, the country suffers from
tremendous political challenges. No matter which Afghan candidate wins the
election, the heavily centralized government in Kabul will remain dysfunctional
and out of touch with people outside the major cities and, most importantly,
distant from the people in the insurgent-infested southern and eastern
provinces.
Any coalition government, in the context of the three decades of armed
conflict in Afghanistan, will lack the political will to fight corruption and
narcotics, which are among the main afflictions of bad governance. We fear that
the next Afghan leader will mainly focus on satisfying conservative views of
coalition partners rather than responding to the inspirations and aspirations of
young Afghans, who constitute a formidable and emerging demographic force.
The Taliban's corroboration in allowing voter registration throughout the
country is an indication of their new political strategy. They will support
pro-Taliban candidates in the parliamentary elections next year. By using terror
and coercion, they hope to constitute a bloc of sympathizers in the next
national assembly. A strong parliamentary coalition between pro-Taliban and
radical MPs, who share a similar religious ideology, is plausible and will
undermine everything that has been achieved in Afghanistan until now.
Indeed, a very weak coalition government in Kabul, confronted by a parliament
influenced by radical MPs, will be the worst-case scenario for the U.S.
administration and NATO forces in Afghanistan. The Afghan government will
succumb to their demands, which will certainly undermine the Afghan constitution
and other internationally accepted values like human rights. The recent adoption
of controversial Shi'a Family Law by the Afghan parliament is just a prelude to
more pressure from the radical elements within the Afghan National Assembly.
The U.S. military and civilian surge will certainly improve security and
speed up the pace of reconstruction and economic development. However, fixing
the Afghan administration and preventing the rise of radical groups as a
political force is a daunting challenge that seems beyond the mandate of the
coalition partners in Afghanistan. We have little hope that a change in
leadership could lead to real change in people's daily lives.
During the past seven years, the U.S. government has too often failed to
quickly react to the ever-changing situation in Afghanistan. The Bush
administration failed to elaborate a clear strategy in Afghanistan. Its "forward
strategy for freedom" in the case of Afghanistan focused on the military side
alone, despite a dire need to foster good governance and strengthen democratic
institutions in the country.
The Obama administration must be proactive about the new challenges in the
country because the Afghan political landscape has always been unpredictable.
Betting on the Afghan election as a vehicle for change risks another setback. I
doubt that the next Afghan leader - whoever it is - will be able to make the
needed changes, because, in addition to the insurgency, the country could grow
weaker from growing ethnic rivalries.
The author served as a special assistant to late Ahmad Shah Massoud,
Afghanistan's former Defense Minister. He is based in Kabul and is director of
Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy Studies.
Note: Originally published in the Prague Post.
Republished here with permission from the author.
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