Don't rush for the exit
By Haroun Mir
October 17, 2008
The situation in Afghanistan in 2008 resembles that of the late 1980s, when
the former Soviet leaders started looking for an exit.
Today, a number of Western diplomats and NATO generals are doing the same
thing. The recent negotiations with the Taliban reflect a revision of U.S. and
NATO strategy from the initial goal of creating a stable Afghan democracy to the
present objective of simply finding a pretext to declare victory and get out of
Afghanistan.
In late 1980s, Soviet leaders explored various bilateral and multilateral
diplomatic channels, including direct engagement with a number of mujahedeen
leaders.
U.S. and Soviet authorities had agreed on the concept of "negative symmetry"
- banning arms sales to both sides - while working for a negotiated settlement
once the Soviet Union withdrew in 1989. However, before a solution was reached,
circumstances changed: The Soviet Union ceased to exist, U.S. attention to
Afghanistan faded, and UN peace plans fell apart.
The consequence of abandoning Afghanistan was the rise of Islamic radicalism
- the emergence of a new breed of terrorism such as Al Qaeda and a Taliban
movement that rejected all internationally accepted human rights values.
Afghanistan in 2008 is not better off than it was in 1988. The government's
authority is reduced to the immediate peripheries of big cities, and insurgents
are closing in on Kabul. Afghans have lost their trust and confidence in the
Afghan authorities.
The pessimistic and gloomy picture of Afghanistan in the international media
over the past year has certainly boosted the morale of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.
Western public opinion has become irritated by the lack of progress and could
eventually accept the reintegration of Taliban as a political entity in
Afghanistan.
We Afghans fear that NATO's rush to find an exit strategy will give an
incentive for regional countries to reactivate their hidden agendas in
Afghanistan.
Afghan security institutions, such as the army and the police, will need at
least an additional decade of direct military support before they can defend
Afghanistan from internal and external threats.
The consequences of a premature exit from Afghanistan will certainly be worse
than what Afghans experienced in the 1990s. If NATO abandons Afghanistan,
galvanized terrorist groups will not be content to stay inside the country. They
will continue fighting NATO - only on NATO's turf.
The current situation in Afghanistan is indeed grave, but it's not lost. We
could still manage the situation and defeat the Taliban if NATO agreed to
reconsider its failed strategy in Afghanistan.
NATO's policy of building a small Afghan Army and police force was arbitrary
and flawed from the beginning. Building Afghan security forces of 500,000
soldiers is still more cost efficient and affordable over a long period of time
than maintaining 50,000 NATO soldiers in Afghanistan for the next several years.
In fact, many Afghan soldiers, who were disbanded from the army under the
failed "Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration" policy, are able to
effectively escort NATO's supply trucks through the Taliban's heartland for a
$500 monthly salary paid by private security companies. If private security
companies can make efficient use of Afghan fighters, why can't NATO?
The Afghan administration has remained corrupt and dysfunctional, and it is
highly unlikely to improve in the coming months because it will dedicate all of
its available resources for the re-election of President Hamid Karzai in 2009.
NATO is left with two choices: to seek a quick exit and let history repeat
itself in Afghanistan, or invest over the next two decades in building a strong
Afghan military and police as a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism
and radical Islamic groups.
Haroun Mir was a special assistant to the late Ahmad Shah Massoud,
Afghanistan's former defense minister. He is co-director of Afghanistan Center
for Research and Policy Studies in Kabul.
Note: Originally published in the International Herald Tribune.
Republished here with permission from the author.
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