The Only Way to Avoid Chaos in Afghanistan
Haroun Mir
November 12, 2009
The top of President Karzai's agenda should be embracing his former rival,
says Haroun Mir—and establishing a united government. Plus, six ways to fix the
Afghan government starting now.
Despite the Independent Election Commission’s decision to put an end to the
election saga under heavy pressure by the international community, the political
crisis in Afghanistan, which emerged after serious allegations of widespread
fraud in the first round election, is still unresolved. President Hamid Karzai’s
rival, Abdullah Abdullah, did not close all of the negotiation doors in hope of
reaching a political compromise after Karzai announced that he will form a
government of national unity.
The faith of Afghanistan will depend on the actions of President Karzai in
the coming days and weeks. Either Karzai will reach out to Abdullah's camp and
form a national unity government or ignore the international pressures and share
the political power with his coalition partners alone.
In the Afghan system of government, which was copied on the U.S. presidential
system, the president holds the whole political power and the opposition remains
irrelevant because the president appoints even provincial and district governors
and the Afghan Parliament has remained politically insignificant.
In most of poor countries such as in Afghanistan, political competition is
not based on political ideology or agenda but over redistribution of resources.
Holding political power means having political influence and access to
government resources. In addition, business and political interests are
interlinked in Afghanistan. Therefore, we cannot expect a constructive political
opposition in the country, which will be sidelined from the political process,
lack access to government resources, and lose its business interests.
If President Karzai refuses to take into consideration the demands of the
opposition in his next government, the country could slide back into political
chaos because the opposition will refuse to recognize not only his legitimacy
but also his authority. In such a scenario, the U.S. administration and its NATO
allies should not remain neutral because their interests will be in jeopardy in
Afghanistan.
In addition, the Obama administration needs a reliable and legitimate partner
in the Afghan government, which has lost its credibility due to widespread
corruption, nepotism, and influence of narco-traffickers. President Karzai has
no other option than to bring considerable changes in his behavior and his style
of management before he takes oath for his new term.
President Karzai will not be able to bring necessary changes without the
assistance of the international community because not only does he have to
satisfy the demands of his coalition partners but also must avoid sidelining the
opposition from the political process. This time his skills in building
political consensus will not be enough, and he must deliver on his promise to
improve his government by forming an accountable and technocratic cabinet.
The Obama administration could use this opportunity by imposing conditions on
its financial assistance to the Afghan government based on achievable
benchmarks. The Afghan government could be fixed and some of the following
measures could be implemented quickly:
1. Reducing the size of the cabinet in order to simplify the process of
decision making and avoid unnecessary competition among ministries over
resources,
2. Creating a mechanism for hiring senior government officials based on merit
rather than based on nepotism and political pressures,
3. Delegating some of the president's decision-making authority to ministers
and provincial governors,
4. Appointing provincial and district governors in consultation with elected
provincial councils,
5. Speeding up reconstruction and economic development efforts in the stable
provinces, in order to make them successful examples,
6. And creating a special court in order to indict drug-traffickers and
corrupt senior officials, even those who had served the previous eight years.
These measures could be implemented in a very short period of time with
vigorous political will both within the Afghan government and the donor
countries, which have high stakes in the country.
The Taliban are not an invincible force, but they have been able to reemerge
and exert their influence because of a vacuum of government authority following
their defeat in 2001 and also due to distrust of the Afghan people from their
government.
I strongly believe that the U.S. military surge combined with improved
governance will create a new momentum in Afghanistan as a precondition to defeat
the Taliban and stabilize the country.
Haroun Mir served as a special assistant to late Ahmad Shah Massoud,
Afghanistan ’s former Defense Minister. He’s director of Afghanistan’s Center
for Research and Policy Studies (ACRPS).
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