The Aftermath Matters More Than the Battle
Haroun Mir
February 17, 2010
The ongoing offensive in the Nad-i-Ali and Marja districts of Helmand
province is a key test of the U.S. military's efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.
It’s obvious that approximately 2,000 Taliban fighters could not resist a joint
assault by 15,000 well-trained U.S., NATO, and Afghan troops. U.S. forces will
easily win this battle. However, the faith of the war depends on the aftermath
of this military operation.
In fact, the last U.S. offensive in Helmand province in July 2009 did not
meet its intended objective because Taliban fighters abandoned their position
only to re-group as a viable opposition force after Afghan forces failed to
establish control of gained territory when U.S. forces left the battlefield.
Alongside the limited capacity of the Afghan national police, inadequate
behavior by Afghan security forces in the context of tribal rivalries in Helmand
province exacerbated the resentment of the local population to government rule.
The U.S. military surge in combat troops offers new hope for a successful
military endeavor against Taliban and extremist forces. The new military
objective is not confined only to defeating enemy forces, but also focuses on
holding gained territory and rebuilding what has been destroyed during the
military operation. Success in this endeavor is crucial for achieving the
difficult task of winning hearts and minds of the local population.
Another key issue is to what extent the U.S. administration will be able to
coerce the government of Pakistan to deny Taliban and other extremist groups
with safe havens and sanctuaries where they continue to enjoy training plus
financial, logistical, and military support.
Moreover, the recent capture of Mullah Baradar, a top Taliban leader, is a
big blow for Taliban commanders and foot soldiers in terms of morale. It will
certainly disrupt the Taliban's command and control, as well as send a clear
warning to other Taliban leaders residing in Pakistan.
It goes without saying that the increased U.S. military presence and pressure
is necessary for breaking the Taliban's momentum. But it is by now evident that
military means alone will not stabilize Afghanistan. A successful Afghan
strategy is also dependent on a credible and effective Afghan government. The
inability of the Afghan government to establish and consolidate good-governance
in remote towns and villages was one of the main reasons for the re-emergence of
Taliban forces in the conflict-prone south and southeastern provinces of
Afghanistan during late 2003 and early 2004.
Indeed, the Taliban were defeated militarily in 2001. And the result of the
current military campaign in Nad-i-Ali and Marja will be the same. Our main
concern should not be the strength of the Taliban, but rather the weakness of
the Afghan government and its inability to offer Afghans basic services. A key
concern for Afghans and the international community is endemic corruption,
cronyism, and nepotism at the central and local levels of government. Many
wonder how the Afghan government will be able to regain the trust of local
people in Marja and Nad-i-Ali when Afghans living and working within 100 meters
of the presidential palace doubt the ability of the central government.
Ultimately, the faith of the U.S. strategy depends on the ability of the
local government to maintain security and ensure the local population with
justice, good governance and basic services.
Haroun Mir is the director of Afghanistan's Center for Research and Policy
Studies.
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