Britain’s Archaic Angle
of Present-Day Afghanistan
By: Sharif Ghalib
Toronto, April 10, 2008
“President Karzai blamed what he called an “extremely ethnic” report in The
Times for his decision to turn down the appointment of Lord Ashdown as the
United Nations super envoy for Afghanistan” (The Times, April 3, 2008).
As history recounts, Afghanistan and Great Britain have gone into three major
conflicts known as the Anglo-Afghan wars. Occurring within the span of 70 years,
the Anglo-Afghan wars represented the geopolitical situation of the 19th Century
giving rise to The Great Game, the competition for territory and influence
between the colonial British and the Russian Czar empires.
However, centuries later on the heels of 9/11/2001, history appeared
repeating itself as the British came back to Afghanistan, this time around not
as occupiers but as a major ally contributing to the international efforts for
the implementation of a United Nations mandate to establish peace, and “to help
Afghanistan build a more stable and secure future”.
By the same token, the United Kingdom came forward as a key donor nation
pledging substantial development and reconstruction funds to help Afghanistan
recover from the scourge of chronic war and mayhem. In early 2006 UK hosted a
historic UN-sponsored international conference on Afghanistan in London, which
specified benchmarks for a strengthened partnership between Afghanistan and the
international community, set out in the conference’s final document known as The
Afghanistan Compact.
In 1996 pursuant to an expansion of peacekeeping operations by NATO, a
contingent of British troops took over security tasks in the Taliban-dominated
southern province of Helmand, superseding US forces.
Deployed as part of NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)
to provide a secure environment in order for the re-building efforts in the
region to take place, the British troops had high hopes to be able to pacify
Helmand without “firing a shot”, in the words of then British Defense Minister
John Reid. But with the violence steadily building through the unchallenged
cross-border replenishment of the Taliban’s man power and a thriving drug trade,
the British forces soon realized that they were confronted with a formidable
foe.
A year into the fighting trying to cope with the mounting fatality among
their soldiers, some British commanders called for “playing the British not
American card” in Helmand, heralding a shift of policy, which eventually led to
a change in their rules of engagement with the enemy. The overhauled modus
operandi shortly coming to light proved to be none other than the one based on a
resuscitated 19th Century colonial school. As a result the district of Musa Qala,
north of Helmand province, was captured by the Taliban. They scored their gain
with the support of the local government intriguingly without a shot being
fired. The British had already withdrawn to leave control with the council of
elders. The Taliban then brokered an agreement with the local tribal elders to
keep the peace; a peculiar exercise that outraged the government of President
Karzai. (Spiked, December 28, 2007)
In the mean time, to complement validation of the handling of Musa Qala,
British media insensitively resorted to lashing out at President Karzai, and
glorifying ethnic and demographic tendencies while referring to the over-all
situation. The trend grew to the point that even the ethnic configuration of the
Karzai government came under scrutiny, raising the alarm across the political
spectrum in Kabul and beyond.
Hence, Musa Qala, destined to fall back to the government forces the next
year, turned to become the first known recourse by the British in a series of
ensuing attempts, all in tune to the 19th Century era Great Game mantra of
ethnic wrangling, deal-making and disbursement of cash to tribal chiefs in
return for short-lived loyalties.
Subsequently in December 2007, a British and an Irish diplomat were expelled
by the Afghan government accused of holding secret talks with the Taliban in
Helmand province. Details of the accusations released by the Afghan government
shockingly even spoke of plans by the British to set up a military training camp
in southern Afghanistan aimed at providing training for as many as 2,000 Taliban
fighters. (The Independent, February 4, 2008)
The allegations caused uproar in the government whereupon it was reflected in
a parliamentary report in which some government officials rather cynically
expressed doubt if the British really wanted to bring security to Helmand.
The report in effect put in perspective the furiousness and awe on the part
of both the government and the average citizens across the country alike
vis-à-vis the British new strategy seeking to extend olive branch to the enemy
and preaching for reaching out to the Taliban. Although, in principle,
consistent with government’s official line of dialogue with the Taliban, those
willing to respond without preconditions, the conduct aroused added commotion
over the unilateral, secretive, and tribe-centric nature of it, which had
practically sidestepped the elected government of Afghanistan.
The bizarre revelation, over time, set the more rhythmic tone for Britain’s
advocacy of conciliation, which culminated in proclamations by the UK government
ranking officials that the Taliban should be brought into the political arena in
Kabul.
Months later as the residual perceived obsolete doctrine by the British of
striking deals with chieftains and fiefdoms continued haunting Afghans, the
unforeseeably contentious anecdote of Lord Ashdown’s nomination as the
succeeding UN envoy in Afghanistan sprung up, which was blocked and, much to
surprise of a great many, turned down by President Karzai.
In point of fact, it is vitally important that President Karzai has finally
spoken his mind and spelled out the rationale behind his stance on Ashdown’s
appointment. For, his asserted attitude over the issue, by and large, echoes the
greater national sentiment across Afghanistan.
Let’s remember that, having been through decades of turmoil and upheaval,
successive overt and creeping invasions, proxy wars, and a historic indigenous
resistance against extremism and terrorism with colossal sacrifices, the people
of Afghanistan have come a real long way. Seven year ago the nation
enthusiastically embraced world's collective efforts for bringing democracy to
the country. With generous solidarity from the international community, among
others, the UK, the country has been able to triumphantly follow through an
ambitious peace accord signed amongst the concerned ethno-political forces, in
Bonn-Germany. Today, a new constitution, the most enlightened of its kind that
Afghans can call to mind, recognizing, inter alia, the multi-ethnic and the
heterogeneous demographic character of the country, continues to guide the
nation through their social and political life as equal citizens of a modern
indivisible pluralistic unitary state.
Accordingly, to guard against these hard-won historic achievements, and in
the interest of durable peace and of long-term stability in the country, allied
governments need to ensure promotion of genuine national unity amongst all
Afghans. They further need to ensure an inclusive approach toward all Afghans
and to engage all moderate peaceful ethno-political forces who are part of the
government and committed to the success of the peace process. Moreover,
considering the socio-political realities of today’s Afghanistan bound to
becoming a modern and democratic state, and in line with the new geo-strategic
imperatives of the region, the world community must avoid creating ethnic
divisions and/or tilt among Afghans.
As for the Taliban, allied nations may need to support the government of
Afghanistan in its bid -- already approved by the nation’s Parliament -- for
engaging all those rank and file combatants, who choose to break with their past
and come to the government fold, in good faith and without any pre-conditions,
pledging allegiance to Afghanistan’s constitution in its entirety, and with the
sole aspiration to re-integrate into the society and pursue a peaceful life.
Without a doubt the people of Afghanistan highly appreciate the magnanimous
contributions by the United Kingdom to the efforts of the international
community to establish peace and stability and to ensure reconstruction in their
country. Likewise, they greatly admire the invaluable sacrifices of the British
soldiers in Afghanistan.
Indispensably, however, London needs to apply more pragmatism to its
strategic approach toward modern Afghanistan, as today, both nations remain an
equal time apart from the 19th Century geopolitical ambience.
End.
Sharif Ghalib served at the UN for ten years, and was the first Afghan
diplomat to negotiate the establishment of full bilateral diplomatic and
consular relations between Afghanistan and Canada at resident-embassy level. He
opened the Embassy of Afghanistan in Ottawa in late 2002 and served as the
country’s Charge d’Affaires, a.i., and Minister Counselor until 2005.
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