Delaying Aid Punishes Afghans For Taliban Sins
Michael Hughes
August 12, 2023
There’s an international development theory, backed by strong evidence, known as the paradox of giving – that foreign aid often leads to more suffering for poverty-stricken countries, and donors ought embrace the Hippocratic oath: “First, do no harm,” as argued by expert William Easterly. The concept that funding and food could make a situation worse is a hard concept to get one’s mind around.
When the Taliban seized Kabul almost two years ago, Western aid that had supported the country’s economy disappeared overnight, a move that would end up only exacerbating the forthcoming crisis. It seemed like a knee-jerk reaction after the international community was stunned by the speed with which both Afghan forces and the government imploded.
Efforts have been made to resume aid while circumventing the radical movement, although it appears the Taliban are continuing to take their share, according to the U.S. reconstruction watchdog’s latest audit. House Foreign Affairs panel chair Michael McCaul said the report shows the Biden administration must be more transparent on Afghan funding and painted an ominous picture about whom the aid was benefitting.
“It is despicable that U.S. taxpayer money is lining the pockets of a terrorist group like the Taliban, which persecutes Afghan women and girls, funds al-Qaeda and other terrorists, perpetrates atrocities against religious minorities, and commits numerous other human rights abuses daily,” McCaul said in a statement on August 8.
Although most donor funding has been directed through the UN system, the report said the Taliban have “effectively infiltrated and influenced most UN-managed assistance programming.” The Taliban appear to view the UN system “as yet another revenue stream,” which their movement will seek to monopolize, the report added.
On the other hand, could the Taliban II regime do much worse than their predecessors, who abused a large percentage of about $140 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds from 2002 to 2021? The Ghani and Karzai administration case studies support Easterly’s paradox thesis: development aid can actually destabilize a war-torn country. In fact, a 2014 State Department assessment concluded that areas where USAID implemented “stabilization” programs actually “decreased stability.”
Then again, let’s not forget, the Taliban were unintended recipients during the conflict. According to former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith, Washington’s puppet governments and the Taliban were one in the same. Galbraith once told author Douglas Wissing: “I described this as a mafia state. We see the Afghan state on one side, and the Taliban on the other. But the reality is they work together.”
Renowned economist Jeffrey Sachs, Easterly’s intellectual arch-rival, has argued that aid programs do work in countries that are not invaded. Mixing security aid with other assistance was the problem all along, according to Sachs. And, as a result, Sachs estimated that probably less than 2% of U.S. funding reached the Afghan people “in the form of basic infrastructure or poverty-reducing services.”
Putting aside the fact IS-K is more deadly and active than ever, one could argue that Afghanistan is technically speaking not engaged in a war. But, apparently, it was more palatable to turn a blind eye while the Taliban skimmed funding illegally during a war versus handing them money directly today.
Some argue it comes down to how the money is allocated. Graeme Smith and Ibraheem Bahiss, from the International Crisis Group (ICG), in a Foreign Affairs piece this week claim there are substantial practical steps that can and must be taken by the international community, including implementation of targeted, short-term, project-oriented, regional initiatives that solve specific societal, climate, or nutrition problems – like water infrastructure issues.
The examples they give underscore the need for fully transparent, earmarked, and designated public funding, with clear conditions and mechanisms to monitor progress. I found it interesting that what they proffer as a potential template is a 50-year old Afghan-Iranian water agreement that failed.
“A blueprint for better cooperation already exists in the form of a 1973 water treaty between the two countries, which guaranteed Iran fixed amounts of water. Negotiations at the time included discussions about increasing Afghan trade through Iranian seaports,” the authors explain. “That treaty was never implemented because of political upheaval in both countries, but the old deal could serve as the basis for today’s negotiations.”
The parties could make the climate adaptations themselves, in theory, the authors said, but both sides are saddled with foreign sanctions. And they warned allowing the Taliban to tackle such a project on their own has proven disastrous and fueled tensions with other states in the region.
“Getting help from organizations such as the World Bank is not only a matter of technical assistance; it could help with the politics of water,” the article suggested. “Financing through the Global Environment Facility, the Green Climate Fund, and the Adaptation Fund could substantially help defray infrastructure costs, but Afghanistan’s access to these funds has been suspended since the Taliban’s takeover.”
In the end, the two ICG analysts made clear that doing nothing is certainly out of the picture:
“Afghanistan’s economic and security troubles cannot be ignored indefinitely, not least because the people who suffer most from instability and deprivation are often women and girls.”