A New Strategy for Afghanistan
By Assem Akram
October 18, 2008
To save Afghanistan from the current downward spiral, radical
changes and serious rethinking are needed. Here are laid out the four legs of a
plan that would decisively change the equation.
It’s only now - as we are entering the eighth year of the US-led
international intervention in Afghanistan and while the situation is degrading
by the day - that the US seems to realize that there is a need to overhaul its
strategy in Afghanistan and come up with a new one. While it is commendable that
the Bush Administration on its way out, after years of denial, has finally
recognized the failure, the remedy offered – i.e. put more US and allied boots
on the ground - shows a misunderstanding of the mechanics in that country.
The two presidential contenders, John McCain and Barack Obama,
unfortunately share that view. Both, with some nuances and differences and, I am
sure, very good intentions, appear to get the right diagnosis – with an
advantage to Senator Obama and his vice presidential pick, Senator Biden, who
realized much earlier than Senator McCain that the situation in Afghanistan was
seriously degrading - but seem to offer the same inadequate solution – i.e. more
troops.
But nothing is revocable and it is never too late to help save a
situation otherwise bound for an abyssal failure. Here are laid out, in a few
words, the four essential legs on which a strategy/plan should be built to
achieve success in Afghanistan and save that country from another tragic
disaster with far-reaching consequences.
The four legs – or components - we are describing here are
interdependent, need to be implemented concurrently and are sine-qua-non
conditions for any glimpse of success to be witnessed. Obviously many other hot
and pressing issues, such as fighting the booming narco-business, could be
included in this list. But we believe that, to be able to tackle many of the
major problems plaguing Afghanistan today, one has to first take care of the
four vital issues described here.
1. Put the Afghan Army on Steroids
The Afghan Army needs to become visibly larger and flex its
muscles. We have said this in the past, and we will repeat it here: The Afghan
Army needs to be at least a hundred fifty thousand men strong and ideally, for a
country in dire need of security to end three decades of conflict, it should
reach a minimal 1% ratio - i.e. reach 250, 000 for an estimated population of 25
million souls. The rapid growth of the Afghan army in numbers as well as in
quality will make it a sizable force to be reckoned with. While there are now
talks of finally doing just that, let’s hope that this is not going to be one of
those empty promises followed by loose inaction, as it has been the case thus
far.
The Afghan Army does not have to reach the preparedness and the
standards of Western elite forces to be efficient. In the Afghan field of
operations, it has advantages that no foreign troop has: home-turf and
proximity. And no amount of money and sophisticated equipments can buy those.
In addition, members of the security forces need to be better
paid and be eligible to receive a ‘hot-spot’ bonus. This is really one area
where spending money can be worth every penny. Potential recruits thinking about
their families’ financial survival should not be pondering between joining a
local warlord’s militia - or that of a drug Baron - and the national security
forces.
Having said that, yes, money matters a great deal, but it’s not
all. For people to join the security forces, there has to be the feeling that
the Government in place is a legitimate one, and has the best interest of the
country as a whole in mind and does not appear to be a corrupt entity with no
will of its own when it comes to essential matters. Only a change in leadership
and Government in Kabul can reinstate confidence, give goals and create hope.
Short of that, there will be no motivation to fight; the survival instinct – and
only that – will prevail.
2. Reorient The Mission of All Foreign Troops
The mission of US and other international forces should be
completely reoriented to solely focus on the border with Pakistan. All security
operations within the Afghan territory should be devolved to the Afghan Army and
security forces.
The presence of foreign troops roaming around on the Afghan soil
and not responding to any authority other than their own is simply unacceptable
and not only violates Afghanistan’s Sovereignty, but it antagonizes a large
portion of the population, which then is turning a growingly more sympathetic
ear to the arguments of groups opposing arms in hand the current power
‘arrangement’ in Kabul.
When it comes to the presence of foreign soldiers with a blurry
mission in a land that is not theirs, there is a clear rule that works along the
same principles as the one laid out by Archimedes in physics: The amount of
pressure applied by foreign troops causes a local reaction equal or superior to
that pressure.
An internationally coordinated action, with a clear new mandate
by the United Nations defining the Afghan-Pakistani border as the focus and
allowing hot pursuit into Pakistani territory, is the key. The border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan – also known as the Durand Line – is a sinuous and
long, very long one, separating the two countries along a very mountainous and
mostly inhospitable territory. This Swiss cheese border is where weapons,
explosives, drug money, and militants are crossing to destabilize Governments on
either sides and this is where all efforts need to be refocused.
All international forces, be they already under UN mandate as
part of the ISAF, or self imposing and operating independently - such as a good
part of the US contingent and some of its European allies - should move under
the UN flag and abide by a new mandate to ensure that the frontier line is as
hermetic as possible – in an unprecedented way so - for a prolonged amount of
time, in an attempt to asphyxiate violent militant groups that thrive in the
border zone and to dramatically reduce cross-border violence.
The tightening of the border would hopefully allow the revamped
and significantly beefed-up Afghan security forces to visibly improve the
security situation inside the country and pave the way for the central
Government to make its presence felt beyond Kabul. The credit earned for
improving the security situation, in conjunction to being the facilitator for
economic and humanitarian stimuli, could make the central Government appear
indispensable in the eyes of local populations.
This redefinition of missions and the separation of tasks has
the potential to produce significant results. While foreign forces would ensure
that the integrity of Afghanistan’s southern international border is respected -
and thus minimize the threat of cross-border violence, Afghan security forces
can concentrate on eliminating two major issues that plague the country and are
significant hurdles on the road to normalization and recovery: thriving narco-business
and private militias.
3. Dramatically Increase Pressure on Pakistan
Islamabad, by delaying its efforts for years and by only
half-heartedly going after Al- Qaeda leaders, has allowed extremist
organizations advocating violence to prosper again and diligently work from
within its territory towards the destabilization of not only Afghanistan but
Pakistan itself.
Pakistan should be the center of US attention and that of its
international allies to mount pressure and force cooperation to 1) prevent its
territory from being used as safe haven for trans-border armed militant
operations; 2) to weaken and contain Taliban-style, Al- Qaeda-inspired groups
flourishing on its soil.
Lately, it seems that the policy in Washington has been
reconsidered and pressure on Islamabad is mounting to do more. US forces are
regularly making incursions into Pakistani territory whether by land or by air.
Most famously, bombings of so-called high value targets by drones have become
almost casual occurrences - in the sense that they do not make the headlines in
the US anymore. This shift is certainly causing stress on the populations in the
border areas as well as undermining furthermore Islamabad’s relations with its
Northern tribal areas, but perhaps the Pakistani Government needs to go through
this phase and overhaul its relationship with the tribal areas to avoid certain
disintegration.
Washington, London, Paris, Riyadh, Beijing, and others should
all weigh on Islamabad to rein in its military and intelligence apparatus (ISI)
by cutting assistance and taking steps towards sanctions – or even actually
starting to implement a first salvo of sanctions to give a taste of how serious
they are about it. No matter what some may say, the ‘carrotand- stick’ approach
remains a popular and quite efficient diplomatic tool.
4. Overhaul The Afghan Political Process
The Government in Afghanistan has to change. It is an
inefficient, feeble and unfortunately corruption-plagued entity that has not
been able to prove itself worthy of the credit and the support of the
International community or that of the Afghan people.
Despite Washington’s blind support, the Karzai Administration
has been unable to perform any of the basic duties that a government – any
government – is expected to perform. It is long overdue to sit down and think
about what kind of really beneficial and sovereign Government Afghanistan
deserves to have - a Government that would be dedicated to the well-being of its
citizens and aware of its enormous responsibilities to alleviate the burden of
its suffering citizens today, while preparing a better tomorrow for its
children.
What is needed is to overhaul the Bonn deal and put everything
back on the drawing board in order to come up with a solution that would truly
and efficiently work towards digging Afghanistan out of the abyss it has fallen
in. In addition to benefiting the Afghan people, any noticeable upward movement
would give satisfaction to the ‘international community of the concerned ones’
because then its members would be able to tell their public opinions that they
have met some of their primary goals when they committed themselves seven years
ago.
No doubt, democratic ideals and popular participation in the
political process are valued around the world, but as for any ideal, they are
sought after but never completely attained. Afghanistan is nowhere today in a
situation to be able to fully practice a political game determined by free and
fair popular elections. While some of the impediments can be open for
discussion, the issue of the increasing lack of security is an obvious and
incontournable one. The challenge is therefore to be able to set up a new
political process that would be as transparent as possible - unlike the 2001
Bonn Agreement that was the result of obscure negotiations and back-alley
arm-twisting that not only left a bitter taste to most parties involved - and
understandably worse to those who were not invited, but was also appallingly
short-sighted in what it established: a coalition of unyielding rivals busy
undermining each other’s power and influence while lured by the unprecedented
flow of foreign money pouring in.
In view of the mistakes of the last seven years, it is clear
that we need a new plan, a new government with a new figurehead. We need a clear
process to reestablish a credible power in Kabul that would not only act more
efficiently in the fields of security enforcement, reconstruction, economic and
social developments, but that it is also careful to uphold the principles of
Sovereignty for the country.
In turn, a better Government, one that does not appear to be a
Washington creation, and one that shows in acts that it cares for its
population, will have a stronger appeal in the provinces and wherever armed
opposition is on the rise. Such Government will be able to lay ground for a
possible dialogue with moderate elements within the armed opposition and be able
to instigate fractures between nationalist and extremist elements tied to non-
Afghan organizations – be they the remnants of Al-Qaeda or some Pakistani and/or
other Arab organizations.
A new process could use the United Nations as facilitator and
guarantor. The UN could appoint a triumvirate of impartial elder statesmen –
ideally former UN envoys in Afghanistan, such as Lakhdar Brahimi, for example,
who would have the advantage of being knowledgeable about the country. The
triumvirate would come up with a list of seven independent Afghan personalities
tasked with proposing essential changes/reforms - including a new leadership and
a new cabinet - that would put Afghanistan back on track and restore confidence
inside and out. A UN sponsored conference bringing around the table all
countries involved in one way or another in the current process – somewhat
similar to the ones that gathered in Berlin, Tokyo or Paris on the subject of
economic reconstruction, but this time with the broader theme of implementing
urgent changes to save Afghanistan and possibly the region from being siphoned
down into a quagmire – would give its seal of approval and pledge to work
following redefined guidelines, in a new environment and with a new global
strategy. This new phase of comprehensive conflict management, in a concerted
effort, would come with a timetable and clear mandates for all major partners –
i.e. Afghan Government, US, UN, European countries, Pakistan, etc.
It may sound like we are going back to square one. But the
reality is that we have erred so far away from what the outcome of years of
conflict and financial/human efforts in Afghanistan could have/should have
produced that it is not unreasonable to be willing to go back to the drawing
board and start over - only, this time, with the experience and the wisdom
acquired from the lessons learned during these past seven years - and
demonstrate the firm will to implement urgently needed changes. After all, isn’t
seven years the age of reason?
Dr. Assem Akram is the author of two books on modern Afghan
History and two works of fiction. He can be reached at:
assemakram@msn.com
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